

RESEARCH ARTICLE

# Constructing Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves under Embedding Degree 1 for Securing Critical Infrastructures

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## Abstract

Information confidentiality is an essential requirement for cyber security in critical infrastructure. Identity-based cryptography, an increasingly popular branch of cryptography, is widely used to protect the information confidentiality in the critical infrastructure sector due to the ability to directly compute the user's public key based on the user's identity. However, computational requirements complicate the practical application of Identity-based cryptography. In order to improve the efficiency of identity-based cryptography, this paper presents an effective method to construct pairing-friendly elliptic curves with low hamming weight 4 under embedding degree 1. Based on the analysis of the Complex Multiplication(CM) method, the soundness of our method to calculate the characteristic of the finite field is proved. And then, three relative algorithms to construct pairing-friendly elliptic curve are put forward. 10 elliptic curves with low hamming weight 4 under 160 bits are presented to demonstrate the utility of our approach. Finally, the evaluation also indicates that it is more efficient to compute Tate pairing with our curves, than that of Bertoni et al.

## 1 Introduction

Many countries have thrived on the wealth from the information technologies (IT) have enabled, and IT forms the backbone of many aspects of the critical infrastructure sectors [1, 2]. There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S. [3]. As noted by both scholars [4–10] and government agencies, such as U.S. Homeland Security, the critical infrastructure represents systems and assets, and it is also defined in detailed [3].

The interconnectivity of the systems in the critical infrastructure sector, and the increasing sophistication, scale and the persistent nature of cyber attacks against such systems, can potentially result in equipment being forced to operate beyond its intended design and safety limits,

resulting in cascading system malfunctions and shut downs such as the collapse of an entire electricity grid; or operating procedures or conditions being manipulated to slow the effort of restoring essential services [11, 12]. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the cyber security of a nation's critical infrastructure (including assets, networks, and systems) is regarded as a top priority of national security by countries around the world [13–17].

One of the key requirements in critical infrastructure cyber security is information confidentiality, and the cryptography is generally the core technology to provide information confidentiality [18].

Identity-based cryptography (IBC) is a relatively new branch of cryptography, which can directly compute a user's public key using publicly available information from the user's identity [19]. Therefore, one does not need to distribute his digital certificate signed by a certificate authority (CA), or query the certificate database to get the other party's public key when conducting electronic transactions. In other words, IBC resolves the challenges and complexity associated with certificate management and traditional public-key cryptosystem. A limitation of IBC is, however, the computation cost involving in constructing the pairings [20]. IBC has the subject of various research, but it remains a topic of ongoing research interest, and one of the research challenges is the generation of efficient parameters such as pairing-friendly elliptic curves.

The existing efficient algorithms to compute Weil and Tate pairings [21, 22] are generally based on Miller's algorithm [23] on (hyper) elliptic curves. One line of research which focuses on reducing the loop in Miller's algorithm was initiated by Duursma-Lee [24] and, subsequently extended by Barreto et al. [25] to supersingular abelian varieties.

In practice, the cryptographic pairings used to construct these systems are based on the Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves over finite fields [26]. Both pairings are a bilinear map from an elliptic curve group on the finite field  $F_p$  to the multiplicative group of some extension field  $F_{p^k}$ . The parameter  $k$  is called the embedding degree of the elliptic curve. The pairing is considered to be secure if both discrete logarithms in the groups  $E(F_p)$  and  $F_{p^k}$  are computationally infeasible.

To optimize the application performance, the parameters  $p$  and  $k$  should be determined according to this standard that both discrete logarithm problems approximately have the equal difficulty when using the best known algorithms. Moreover, a large prime factor  $r$  should be included in the order of the group  $\#E(F_p)$ . For example, if the large prime factor  $r \geq 2^{160}$ , the pairing is generally considered to be safe against existing attacks. Therefore, it is essential to be able to construct elliptic curves efficiently for arbitrary  $p$  and  $k$  values to differ the security level or to meet the requirement of discrete log in future improvements. This is the gap we attempt to address in this paper.

This paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we introduce the reader to related literature and Tate pairing, respectively. In Section 4, we describe our approach to constructing pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1 and preliminary evaluation results to demonstrate utility and practicality. Our discussion and concluding remarks are provided in the last two sections.

## 2 Related Work

Constructing elliptic curves with various embedding degrees has been the subject of ongoing research. For example, Cocks and Pinch [27] constructed the curves with arbitrary embedding degree  $k$ , but the efficiency is very low because the size  $q$  of the field  $F_p$  is limited by the subgroup of prime order  $r$  with  $q \approx r^2$ . Fotiadis and Konstantinou [28] presented two general methods to produce sparse families and applied them to four embedding degrees  $k$ , where  $k$ .

Barreto and Naehrig [29] constructed the curves of prime order with  $k = 12$ . Freeman [30] proposed a construction for the curves with embedding degree  $k = 10$ . A complete characterization of common elliptic curves of prime order with  $k = 3, 4$ , or  $6$ , is provided by Miyaji, Nakabayashi, and Takano [31]. Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone [32] illustrated that embedding degree  $k$  should be not more than 6 in a supersingular elliptic curve, especially  $k \leq 3$  and  $k \neq 2$  or  $k \neq 3$ . Some researches [33] reduced the ratio  $\rho = \frac{\log p}{\log r}$  for arbitrary  $k$  between the characteristic of the finite field and the prime order  $r$  of the subgroup. However, no concrete examples have been proposed with  $\rho$  small enough to construct curves with prime order.

In fact, if  $k = 1$ , the pairing will become a bilinear map from the elliptic curve group on the finite field  $F_p$  to the elliptic curve group on the same finite field  $F_p$ . In other words, we would not involve the extension field  $F_p^k$  when computing the pairing, which is the constraint in pairing-based cryptography applications.

Izuta, Nogami and Morikawa [34] proposed a method for generating a certain composite order ordinary pairing-friendly elliptic curve of embedding degree 1. In their method, the order has two large prime factors such as the modulus of RSA cryptography. Lee and Park [35] proposed a new algorithm to construct Brezing-Weng-like elliptic curves having the Complex Multiplication (CM) equation of degree 1, as well as presenting new families of curves with larger discriminants.

It is clear from the literature that pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1 are constructed on the base field, rather than the extension field, which can significantly improve the computation efficiency of Tate pairing. This is the gap that this paper attempts to address. More specifically, this paper proposes an effective method to construct pairing-friendly elliptic curves with low hamming weight 4 under embedding degree 1.

### 3 Tate Pairing

In practice, as the theoretical model is unknown, we use the Monte-Carlo method [36] to generate the required data based on a fixed theoretical model.

Weil pairing was first introduced into cryptography by Menezes, which was used to study the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem on certain elliptic curves [32]. Extending on the work of Menezes, Frey introduced Tate pairing to cryptography [37], which is now widely used to design pairing-based cryptosystems because Tate pairing is twice as efficient as Weil pairing.

Let  $E$  be an elliptic curve over a finite field  $F_p$ , and  $r$  be a positive integer which is co prime to  $p$ . In most applications,  $r$  is a prime and  $r \nmid \#E(F_p)$ . Let  $k$  be a positive integer such that the field  $F_{p^k}$  contains the  $r$ -th roots of unity, and  $k$  is called the embedding degree. Then Tate pairing is a mapping [38]:

$$t(P, Q) : E(F_{p^k})[r] \times E(F_{p^k})/rE(F_{p^k}) \rightarrow F_{p^k}^*/(F_{p^k}^*)^r$$

According to the definition of Tate pairing, if the embedding degree  $k \neq 1$ , then the computation of Tate pairing is related to the extension field  $F_{p^k}$ , and the computation process will be time-consuming. However, if the embedding degree  $k = 1$ , the computation of Tate pairing only runs on the base field  $F_p$  rather than the extension field  $F_{p^k}$ . This will greatly improve the computation efficiency of Tate pairing.

In Tate pairing, both the point  $P$  and the point  $Q$  are from two different subgroups with the same order  $r$  as subgroup  $E(F_{p^k}[r])$  and  $(F_{p^k}^*)^r$  respectively. That is to say, if  $k = 1$ , then the point  $P$  and the point  $Q$  come from two different subgroup  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  of  $E(F_p)$  with the same order  $r$ , and  $G_1 \cap G_2 = \emptyset$ . However, "How to construct the elliptic curve which includes two different groups with the same order  $r$  when  $r$  is a large prime with  $r \geq 2^{160}$ ?" and "How to find the two

different groups?” are two key challenges in designing pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1.

In this paper, we propose an effective algorithm to construct pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1. In our algorithm, it can be ensured that both the point  $P$  and the point  $Q$  are from two different subgroups with the same order  $r$ , which enables the computation of Tate pairing to run only on the base field.

## 4 Constructing Pairing-friendly Elliptic Curves

In this section, a new method to generate pairing-friendly elliptic curves is proposed, which comprises three algorithms as follows.

1. The first algorithm is used to generate a large prime of low hamming with weight 4.
2. The second algorithm is used to generate the finite field  $p$ , the order  $u$  of a non-supersingular elliptic curve over  $F_p$ , the order  $r$  of a point on the elliptic curve.
3. The last algorithm is used to construct pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1.

### 4.1 The Construction Method

In the common method [31, 35] to construct elliptic curves, the equation  $u = p + 1 \pm W$  is used to generate the parameters of the elliptic curves. This equation provides a means to determine the order  $\#E$  of an elliptic curve  $E$  according to the characteristic  $p$  of the finite field  $F_p$ . However, the order  $\#E$  generated using the equation is generally unable to meet the security requirement. Therefore, it is a challenge to generate a suitable elliptic curve using the common method. Moreover, even if a suitable elliptic curve can be generated, it will take a long time. For example, in the method of Izuta, Nogami and Morikawa [34], it will take about 20 hours to generate an elliptic curve.

In our method, we present a new equation  $p = u \pm W + 1$  to generate the parameters of elliptic curves. On first glance, the new equation may appear similar to the common equation. However, in the new equation, the order  $\#E$  is known, and we need to obtain  $p$  from the order  $\#E$  (rather than the order  $\#E$  from  $p$ ). Thus, we only need to determine the characteristic  $p$  of the finite field  $F_p$  from the order  $\#E$  of an elliptic curve  $E$ , and our algorithm 2 describes the process required to generate  $p$  from the order  $\#E$ . In other words, we can generate an elliptic curve under arbitrary order, while the order  $\#E$  of an elliptic curves  $E$  can be trivially obtained using  $u = r * r$  (from the security requirement), where  $r$  is a large prime, and  $r$  has a low hamming with weight 4 (based on our algorithm 1). As the order of the subgroup is a large prime of low hamming with weight 4, the efficiency of generating elliptic curves is significantly improved. More specifically, our method requires about 200 ms to generating a suitable elliptic curve.

**Theorem 1** If  $E$  is a non-super singular elliptic curve over  $F_p$  with order  $u$ ,  $D$  is the CM discriminant for  $p$ , according to the discriminant condition  $4p = W^2 + DV^2$  and  $u = p + 1 \pm 1$ , then

$$p = u \pm X + 1$$

where  $W = X \pm 2$ ,  $V = Y$ .

Proof. It is well known that the CM discriminant  $D$  for  $p$  meets the Eqs (1) and (2) for every non-super singular elliptic curve over  $F_p$  with order  $u$ .

$$4p = W^2 + DV^2 \tag{1}$$

$$u = p + 1 \pm W \tag{2}$$

The Eq (3) can be gotten from the Eq (2).

$$4u = 4p + 4 \pm 4W \tag{3}$$

The Eq (4) can be gotten by replacing  $4p$  with the Eq (1) in the Eq (3).

$$4u = W^2 + DV^2 + 4 \pm 4W \tag{4}$$

The Eq (4) can be written as the Eq (5).

$$4u = (W \pm 2)^2 + DV^2 \tag{5}$$

The Eq (5) can be written as the Eq (6).

$$4u = X^2 + DY^2 \tag{6}$$

where  $X = W \pm 2$  and  $Y = V$ .

Therefore, the Eq (1) can be converted to the Eq (7) with  $X = W \pm 2$ .

$$4p = (X \pm 2)^2 + DY^2 \tag{7}$$

The Eq (8) can be gotten from the Eqs (6) and (7)

$$4p = 4u \pm 4X = 4 \tag{8}$$

The Eq (8) can be written as the Eq (9)

$$p = u \pm X + 1 \tag{9}$$

This ends the proof.

Theorem 1 provides a method to calculate the characteristic  $p$  of the finite field  $F_p$  according to the order  $u$  of an elliptic curve. That is to say, for any elliptic curve with the order  $u$  expected, we can easily calculate the characteristic  $p$  of the finite field  $F_p$  according to the Eq (9). This is a new way, which can generate an elliptic curve under any order we expected.

In Miller algorithm of computing Tate pairing, if some bit of the binary representation for the order  $r$  of subgroup is '1', operators would be needed to compute multiplication and inverse operations [39]. Otherwise, (i.e. if the binary bit is '0'), no additional operator is needed. It is clear that the process to compute Tate pairing will be more efficient if the binary representation of the order  $r$  has fewer '1' bits and more '0' bits. This forms the basis of the three relative algorithms.

## 4.2 Algorithm 1

Algorithm 1 outlines the method to generate a large prime of low hamming with weight 4. In other words, there are only two '1' bits in addition to the highest bit and the lowest bit in the binary representation for the large prime. The large prime will be used as the order  $r$  of subgroup in algorithms 2 and 3.

In algorithm 1, the input parameter is the length  $m(m \geq 160)$  of the binary representation for the large prime, the output result is the large prime  $r$  of low hamming with weight 4.

Algorithm 1. Generating a large prime of low hamming with weight 4.

Input: The length  $m(m \geq 160)$  of the binary representation for the large prime; a positive integer  $t$  for the number of trials.

Output: The large prime  $r$  of low hamming with weight 4.

```

step 1 Choose random  $s, t$  in the interval  $(0, m-1)$  to ensure  $0 < s < t < m-1$ ;
step 2  $r \leftarrow 2^0 + 2^s + 2^t + 2^{m-1}$ ;
step 3 Compute  $v$  and an odd value  $w$ , such that  $r-1 = 2^v w$ 
step 4 For  $j$  from 1 to  $t$  do
    step 4.1 Choose random  $a$  in the interval  $0 < a < r$ ;
    step 4.2 Set  $b \leftarrow a^w \bmod r$ 
    step 4.3 If  $b = 1$  or  $b = r-1$ , goto step 4.6;
    step 4.4 For  $i$  from 1 to  $v-1$  do
        step 4.4.1 Set  $b \leftarrow b^2 \bmod r$ 
        step 4.4.2 If  $b = r-1$  goto step 4.6;
        step 4.4.3 if  $b = 1$ , goto step 1;
        step 4.4.4 Next  $i$ .
    step 4.5 goto step 1;
    step 4.6 Next  $j$ ;
step 5 Output  $r$ .

```

### 4.3 Algorithm 2

Algorithm 2 describes the method to generate the finite field  $p$ , the order  $u$  of a non-supersingular elliptic curve over  $F_p$ , and the order  $r$  of a point on the elliptic curve according to the length  $m (m \geq 160)$  of the finite field  $p$ .

Algorithm 2. Generating the finite field  $p$ , the order  $u$  of a non-supersingular elliptic curve over  $F_p$ , and the order  $r$  of a point on the elliptic curve.

Input: The length  $m (m \geq 160)$  of the finite field  $p$ .

Output: The finite field  $p$ , the order  $u$  of a non-supersingular elliptic curve over  $F_p$ , the order  $r$  of a point on the elliptic curve.

```

step 1 Generate a large prime  $r$  of low hamming with weight 4 using algorithm 1;
step 2 Compute the order  $u$  of a non-supersingular elliptic curve  $u = r^2$ ;
step 3 Assign  $D = 3$ , set  $X = r, Y = r$ , such that the values of both  $X$  and  $Y$  satisfy the condition  $4u = X^2 + DY^2$ ;
step 4 Compute  $p = r^2 + r + 1$  according to  $p = u \pm X + 1$  when  $u = r^2, X = r$ ;
step 5 If  $p$  is not a prime, goto Step 1;
step 6 Output the finite field  $p$ , the order  $u$  of a non-supersingular elliptic curve over  $F_p$ , the order  $r$  of a point on a elliptic curve.

```

We would also remark that “the IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography” [40] recommends that in the construction of a curve with prescribed CM, if  $D = 3$ , the coefficients  $a_0$  and  $b_0$  of  $E$  should be 0 and 1 respectively.

### 4.4 Algorithm 3

Algorithm 3 presents the method to construct pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1. We assume that there are two different subgroups with the same order  $r$  on the elliptic curve generated by algorithm 3, where  $r$  is a large prime.

In algorithm 3, the input parameter is the length  $m (m \geq 160)$  for the subgroup order, and the output results are  $a, b$  and the prime  $p$  as the parameters of the elliptic curve  $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ , low hamming prime  $r$  as the order of subgroup, point  $P_1$  as the base point for

generating subgroup  $G_1$  while calculating Tate pairing, where  $rP_1 = 0$ , and point  $P_2$  as the base point for generating subgroup  $G_2$  while calculating Tate pairing where  $rP_1 = 0$ ,  $rP_2 = 0$  and  $G_1 \cap G_2 = \emptyset$ .

Algorithm 3 is designed to be convenient for users generating pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1, as the only input parameter is the length of the binary representation for the order  $r$  of the subgroup. Algorithm 3 runs by calling algorithm 2, which in turn calls algorithm 1.

Algorithm 3. Constructing pairing-friendly elliptic curves.

Input: The length  $m$  ( $m \geq 160$ ) for the subgroup order.

Output:  $a$ ,  $b$  and the prime  $p$  denote the parameters of the elliptic curve  $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ , low hamming order  $r$  denotes the order of subgroup, point  $P_1$  ( $rP_1 = 0$ ) and point  $P_2$  ( $rP_2 = 0$ ).

step 1 Generate the finite field  $p$ , the order  $u$  of a non-supersingular elliptic curve over  $F_p$ , the order  $r$  of a point on the elliptic curve using algorithm 2;

step 2 Select an integer  $\zeta$  with  $0 < \zeta < p$ ;

step 3 Set  $a \leftarrow 0$  and  $b \leftarrow b_0 \zeta \pmod{p}$ ;

step 4 Locate a point  $P_1$  with order  $r$  on the curve  $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ .

step 5 If the output of Step 4 is in the wrong order, goto Step 2.

step 6 Locate a point  $P_2$  with order  $r$  on the curve  $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ , where  $P_2 \notin \{kP_1 \mid k \in \{1, 2, \dots, r\}\}$ .

step 7 The output  $p$ ,  $a$ ,  $b$  as the parameters of the elliptic curve  $y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ , the large prime  $r$  with low hamming weight as the order of subgroup, the point  $P_1$  as the base point for generating subgroup  $G_1$  while calculating Tate pairing, where  $rP_1 = 0$ , and the point  $P_2$  as the base point for generating subgroup  $G_2$ , while  $rP_2 = 0$  and  $G_1 \cap G_2 = \emptyset$ .

The elliptic curve generated by algorithm 3 can potentially include two different subgroups  $G_1$  and  $G_2$ , with large prime order  $r$  with low hamming weight for computing Tate pairing. Because the order  $r$  of subgroup is a public parameter, these parameters generated by the algorithms presented in the paper do not impact on the security of Pairing-based cryptosystems(PBC).

## 4.5 Preliminary Findings

We implement the construction described in Section 4.1 using Pentium 4 PC (CPU 3.06GHz), and the findings are as follows.

Algorithm 1:

$$r = 730750818686719107034401070324602422792720220161 = 2159 + 2124 + 228 + 20$$

Algorithm 2:

$$p = 533996759011310222874819404525682685548618076116297227036988012012286237103997609758897031086083$$

$$r = 730750818686719107034401070324602422792720220161$$

$$u = r^2 = 533996759011310222874819404525682685548618076115566476218301292905251836033673007336104310865921$$

Algorithm 3:

[Table 1](#) describes 10 elliptic curves generated by algorithm 3 under the above  $p$ ,  $r$ ,  $u$ .

## 5 Discussion

In the Miller algorithm, for every bit of the order  $r$  of the subgroup, we would need to compute 16 multiplication and 7 inverse operations. If the bit is 1, however, we would need to compute

Table 1. 10 pairing-friendly curves with low hamming weight 4 under given  $p, r, u(r$  with 160 bits).

Parameters	$b$	$P_1$	$P_2$
The 1 <sup>st</sup> group	5582	(92216901,324171638614811955738700451351453938462743355 9133041256667979195175749628071873615638670182400781)	(2900911840,4705653270894656087667172905567243436118758 27533253971039274229090627830093258979017255917746829)
The 2 <sup>nd</sup> group	411	(6456,20078365331264325300042768518536167282488957802 9877838466376294032581210908578307946592006236274)	(7718449758221,24659470006395068249934574385858155040979 30070297024236206310323091872683222195273368059885703980)
The 3 <sup>rd</sup> group	6888558	(63,483447298606802197007667782086007062212874881060 089832042154800397367248862591909523693105053579)	(503,77335678175724311469109067552943334864235153595 640796029200821503606472539285202409938146494560)
The 4 <sup>th</sup> group	1852511737533	(28136114,24215869977581465479291416510903012751313501 9773154553510244588647142304534134418272078033955490)	(86590,1215517622354270486043067049387207697308306011 13589433595621413717088224050169417598237928822315)
The 5 <sup>th</sup> group	111158	(9069952,191884782129835076896430782729279489410474467 097317768476761535512656282281715989056396995028939)	(40,36206386607014264628739190171503840432854094467 4222712928339139412213864564948793769019222805261)
The 6 <sup>th</sup> group	7134	(352,373120637403567989697297819791130549970377887442 049625481567602466046997349176087351878502769389)	(1171827216,497218853134580775259647604103261612371250 535098304079416233175139145924214924867402939952308203)
The 7 <sup>th</sup> group	562	(7751170,17008963163876512324577202641307035165655563 5734890000712753208456308661954335842959630945562639)	(9123978,49169658825075112831669074298937624721989297 3435085382978639044870863996676582978948360971631311)
The 8 <sup>th</sup> group	1105557501121	(96209917051711,525444938515542636510109073176195118053709 5809586740545805755386839131992568764934554139827350205)	(12835,741274952967150151184975581746237231564737457 92295184182056487700402725864604342423009775785761)
The 9 <sup>th</sup> group	814	(76110676327,4552307706686746350010731489496121100227162 52695998918206294806414038955424454903144922555015137)	(856171875,173617915786825759289299665430112058480332 33611185463361858494144333951770711174509831733937961)
The 10 <sup>th</sup> group	1110977	(935542646001,425605723028492010195922479602517755514636 860155519341225132168354176911010027713634301519279864)	(211058810,42440860733333485310270072332877409433745147 3846030924917501392093461859795155755424956700868152)

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**Table 2. Efficiency analysis.**

	The ordinary PBC				PBC with parameter in the paper			
	Every bit (160 bits)		Every bit with 1 (79 bits)		Every bit (160 bits)		Every bit with 1 (3 bits)	
	Multiple	Inverse	Multiple	Inverse	Multiple	Inverse	Multiple	Inverse
	16	7	11	5	16	7	11	5
	2560	1120	869	395	2560	1120	33	15
Total	Multiple:3429 Inverse:1515				Multiple:2593 Inverse:1135			

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11 multiplication and five inverse operations. For the order  $r$  of the subgroup with 160 bits in ordinary PBCs, there are 80 '1' bits on average. Therefore, we would need to compute 3,429 multiplication and 1,515 inverse operations. It is pleasing to note that using the parameters in our approach, we only need 2,593 multiplication and 1,135 inverse operations, as shown in [Table 2](#).

An inverse operation is estimated to be 5.18 multiplication operations [39], and implementing our method outlined in this paper will save 24.9% of the time required to compute the Tate pairing:

$$\frac{2593 + 1135 * 5.18}{3429 + 1515 * 5.18} = 0.751 = 75.1\%$$

To demonstrate the practicality of the new method we proposed, using the parameters with 160 bits presented in [Table 1](#), we implement a proof-of-concept on a Pentium 4 PC (CPU 3.06GHz) in [Table 3](#), using the parameters with 160 bits presented in [Table 1](#).

As shown in [Fig 1](#)., our implementation takes 12.93 ms to compute a pairing. We then compared with the findings from Bertoni et al. [39], as shown in [Table 3](#). In the latter, the large prime of the order of the subgroup is 160 bits, but with a Hamming weight equal to 3 and the embedding degree of 2. As shown in [Table 3](#), our algorithm is more computationally efficient compared to that of Bertoni et al.

The computation results depicted in [Fig 1](#). can also be verified using the bilinear characteristic of Tate pairing, as explained below:

$$t(P, 2Q) = t(2P, Q) = t(P, Q)^2$$

$$t(P, 3Q) = t(3P, Q) = t(P, Q)^3$$

Recall that in Tate pairing, if the embedding degree  $k \neq 1$ , then the computation of Tate pairing is related to the extension field  $F_{p^k}$ , which is very time consuming. Building on Miller's algorithm, we present an effective algorithm to construct pairing friendly elliptic curves with low hamming weight 4 under embedding degree 1, which enables the computation of Tate pairing only on the base field.

**Table 3. Comparative summary of Tate pairing computations.**

Parameters	The result from Bertoni et al. [39]	The result from this paper
Platform	PentiumIII @ 1GHz	Pentium IV @ 3.06GHz
Length of prime	160 bits	160 bits
Low Hamming Weight	3	4
Time for a Tate pairing	41ms	12.93ms

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```

F:\TatePairing\Debug\TatePairing.exe
Input P,Q,S:92216901
32417163861481195573870045135145393846274335591330412566797919517574962807187361
5636670182400781
2900911840
47056532708946560876671729055672434361187582725325397103927422909062783009325897
9017255917746829
2900911840
47056532708946560876671729055672434361187582725325397103927422909062783009325897
9017255917746829
e<P,Q,S>=50131569152708117537479233917247114277941754744788161187105777194287266
4466403007730492718725345
Time cost for the computation of a Tate Pairing:12.9349ms
e<2P,Q,S>=4240745151539610661386232560266330829434351890860189023985103736919592
37999079610085168445281771
e<P,2Q,S>=4240745151539610661386232560266330829434351890860189023985103736919592
37999079610085168445281771
e<P,Q,S>^2=424074515153961066138623256026633082943435189086018902398510373691959
237999079610085168445281771
e<3P,Q,S>=3966081104105701900784516403224007456289581082417319550289261459406628
13996117845053125060622443
e<P,3Q,S>=3966081104105701900784516403224007456289581082417319550289261459406628
13996117845053125060622443
e<P,Q,S>^3=396608110410570190078451640322400745628958108241731955028926145940662
813996117845053125060622443
    
```

**Fig 1. The result of computing Tate pairing on the first group curve.** The first 9 lines gives the parameters of the first group curves. Then the result of  $e(P, Q)$ ,  $e(2P, Q)$ ,  $e(P, 2Q)$ ,  $e(3P, Q)$ ,  $e(P, 3Q)$ ,  $e(P, Q)^2$  and  $e(P, Q)^3$  are given and the bilinear property is verified.

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## 6 Conclusion

Ensuring information confidentiality in critical infrastructures will be increasingly important in our increasingly interconnected world. In this paper, we studied the generation method of pairing-friendly elliptic curves for identity-based cryptography(IBC), with the aim to significantly improve the computation efficiency of IBC. We demonstrated how pairing-friendly elliptic curves can be efficiently conducted, both in theory and practice which can be deployed in critical infrastructure systems, such as cyber-physical systems with limited resources [40]. In our approach, pairings computing requires only the base field, rather than the extension field.

More specifically, in this paper, we described and conducted a preliminary analysis of the new method to construct pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1. Unlike the existed traditional CM methods, the parameters are not randomly generated in our method. The parameters are computed under a given expression, which significantly improves the efficiency of generating elliptic curve. Moreover, in our algorithm, the only input parameter is the binary length of the large prime  $r$ , and then all parameters of the elliptic curve can be rapidly generated. Our method consists of three algorithms, namely: an algorithm to generate low hamming prime  $r$  according to the expected length of the large primer, which is also used as the order of the subgroup; an algorithm to calculate the character  $p$  of the finite field  $F_p$  and the order  $u$  of the elliptic curve according to the prime  $r$ ; and an algorithm to generate the pairing-friendly elliptic curves and the two different points  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  on the elliptic curve with the same order  $r$ . It also ensures  $G_1 \cap G_2 = \emptyset$ , where  $G_1$  is the subgroup generated by  $P_1$  and  $G_2$  is the subgroup generated by  $P_2$ ,  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  are two different subgroups of  $E$  with the same order  $r$ .

The paper also provided 10 elliptic curves with low hamming, weight 4 under 160 bits generated using our algorithms, which demonstrated the utility of our method. Then, we demonstrated the practicality of our method by implementing the method using Tate pairing.

Our curves can be applied in real world such as Internet of Things(IoT), Electronic Commerce (EC) and Copyright Protection(CP). In fact, in all fields, which are involved in public key cryptography, the proposed method can be applied to implement digital signature, key management and authentication protocol [41–43]. The future work includes two aspects. The first aspect is to optimize Miller's algorithm to improve the computation efficiency of Tate pairing. The other aspect is to apply the elliptic curves constructed by our method to the practical cryptosystem.

## Supporting Information

**S1 File. Pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1 with 160 bits.** There are 10 group pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1 with 160 bits. In every group, the parameters of  $p, r, \#E, b, P, Q$  are given. The parameters of  $a$  is equal 0 in all groups. (PDF)

**S2 File. Pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1 with 190 bits.** There are 10 group pairing-friendly elliptic curves under embedding degree 1 with 160 bits. In every group, the parameters of  $p, r, \#E, b, P, Q$  are given. The parameters  $a$  is equal 0 in all groups. (PDF)

## Author Contributions

**Conceptualization:** MCW GMD.

**Data curation:** MCW KRC.

**Formal analysis:** MCW RR.

**Funding acquisition:** MCW GMD.

**Investigation:** MCW.

**Methodology:** MCW GMD.

**Project administration:** MCW.

**Resources:** MCW.

**Software:** MCW GMD.

**Supervision:** GMD.

**Validation:** MCW GMD PPJ.

**Visualization:** PPJ RR.

**Writing – original draft:** MCW KRC.

**Writing – review & editing:** MCW RR.

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